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between specific decades. Besides, the colonial state’s dynamic con-
nection to the metropole is mostly absent in the book.
 Rationalizing Korea is an ambitious overview of government 
administrations from the late nineteenth century to the colonial 
period. The overview involves original research in some chapters and 
presents a sophisticated synthesis of secondary sources in other chap-
ters. The book enlightens us about the current stage of studies on the 
rise of a modern state in Korea and raises important questions for 
 further research. Despite some archival and conceptual limitations, the 
book will be an indispensable introduction to the history of the colo-
nial state in Korea.
The Lama Question: Violence, Sovereignty, and Exception 
in Early Socialist Mongolia by Christopher Kaplonski. 
Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2014. Pp. xvii + 259. 
$54.00.
Christopher P. Atwood, University of Pennsylvania
In The Lama Question, Christopher Kaplonski tackles one of most piv-
otal and sensitive questions in the modern history of independent 
Mongolia: how the government of one of the world’s most Buddhist 
countries wiped out the sangha, or Buddhist monastic community, 
as an institution. As Kaplonski notes, in September 1937 Mongolia 
had 83,203 monks resident in monasteries out of a total population of 
roughly 745,000. Less than a year later, only 562 were left in the monas-
teries. Over 40,000 had fled and laicized; 17,000 still considered them-
selves monks but lived in the countryside; and 5,000 joined various 
fledgling collective enterprises. Of the rest, almost 20,000 had been 
convicted of crimes and about 18,000 were executed.
 This crescendo of violence and the fifteen-year campaign of govern-
ment pressure and intimidation that led up to it could be approached 
in many ways. In writing the first archivally based book on the topic in 
English, Kaplonski could have easily confined himself to what journal-
ists call the “tick-tock”—who did what and when during this campaign 
that wiped clean the slate of Mongolia’s society and made it ready for 
socialism. Indeed, the archival work on which this book is based is 
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careful and accurate, and it is often enlivened by vivid vignettes and 
details. More so than any other offering in the still-slim bookshelf of 
English-language books on the revolutionary era in Mongolia, The 
Lama Question offers a satisfying picture of how the machinery of 
control, discrimination, and ultimately legal and extralegal repression 
actually worked from 1924 to 1938.1 In addition to providing fairly full 
coverage of the abundant Mongolian published literature,2 he accessed 
extensive archival material from the National Central Archives, the 
Supreme Court Archives, Party Archives, and the Foreign  Ministry 
Archives. The contrast with Larry Moses’s Political Role of Mongol 
 Buddhism is stark.3 Writing at the height of the Sino-Soviet Cold War 
and Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal’s enforcement of a regime of Brezhnev-style 
philistinism and conformity, Moses was unable even to do research in 
Mongolia and had to base his work entirely on secondary published 
work.4 Unfortunately, however, the archives of the Mongolian Central 
Intelligence Agency, the successor of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
which actually carried out the purges, are still not open to researchers, 
a point to which I will return.
 But instead of just “telling the story,” Kaplonski aims to use this 
story to describe what he, following Giorgio Agamben, calls the 
“exception”—a suspension of normative and juridical powers by meta-
juridical authority that in fact establishes the sovereign’s power in the 
very act of “instituting a threshold of undecideability between the 
authority to suspend the law and the power to implement it” (p. 31). 
Ultimately, Kaplonski finds that Agamben’s conceptualization needs to 
be nuanced, and he offers instead of just “exception” a concept of mul-
tiple “technologies of exception” (p. 30). These technologies consist 
1 See, for example, Baabar (Bat-Erdene Batbayar), Twentieth Century Mongolia, trans. 
and ed. Christopher Kaplonski (Cambridge: White Horse Press, 1999); D. Dashpurev and 
S. K. Soni, Reign of Terror in Mongolia, 1920–1990 (New Delhi: South Asia Publishers, 1992); 
and Shagdariin Sandag and Harry H. Kendall, Poisoned Arrows: The Stalin- Choibalsang 
Mongolian Massacres, 1921–1941 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000).
2 One of the few relevant sources he misses is D. Tsogt-Ochir, Khelmegdsen Yegüzer 
Khutagt J. Galsandash (Ulaanbaatar: Archives of the Agency for the Assurance of State 
Security, 1992).
3 Larry Moses, The Political Role of Mongol Buddhism (Bloomington: Asian Studies 
Research Institute, Indiana University, 1977).
4 Kaplonski does not even include Moses’s book in the bibliography, which is unfor-
tunate—although not a major contribution under the circumstances, the work does, I 
think, deserve to be mentioned.
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of three different broadly chronological, but also overlapping, ensem-
bles of laws and exception to laws that played out from the mid-1920s 
to the final denouement in 1938. The first technology, salient from 
1926 to 1934, was one of nonphysical violence and accommodation. 
The second technology of exception, salient from 1934 to 1937, intro-
duced class-based discriminatory and confiscatory taxation regimes. 
Finally, in 1937 began the third technology of exception—show trials, 
an extraordinary plenipotentiary commission, dehumanizing rheto-
ric, and mass executions. Yet, alongside it, the two earlier technologies 
continued, separating lamas by class and putting on regular trial lamas 
convicted, for example, of poisoning the people through Tibetan med-
icine. Through all of his story, Kaplonski underlines the fragility of the 
Mongolian state—the great difficulty it faced in making its normative 
and juridical powers seem convincing—which led paradoxically, he 
argues, to a sustained effort to delay as long as possible the turn to the 
raw exercise of sovereign authority.
 Kaplonski’s treatment thus raises many uncomfortable issues that 
Mongolian citizens and historians of Mongolia have often preferred to 
avoid. As he points out in the introduction, Mongolian political folk-
lore celebrates how Genden, the Mongolian maximum leader from 
1932 to 1936, went so far as to smash Stalin’s pipe during one of their 
meetings. If Mongolian leaders were so vigorous in resisting, the folk-
lore implies, then surely the eventual annihilation of the lamas must 
have been forced on the Mongolian people by the Soviet Union and 
must not have been something Mongolians did to themselves. But 
Kaplonski has chosen to focus not on the geopolitical angle but rather 
on how the Mongolian state itself organized and implemented the 
campaigns that culminated in the annihilation of the lamas, a cam-
paign that resulted in what Kaplonski acknowledges as genocide. To 
that extent, he is therefore investigating a kind of auto-genocide, in a 
country of only three million today, where descendants of the perpe-
trators and victims live side by side.
 At least as disturbing for Kaplonski, though, is the degree to which 
he found himself “seeing like a state”—more specifically, seeing like a 
state that felt itself genuinely threatened by the continued existence 
of the “state within a state” that Stalin accused the Buddhist sangha of 
being. As he writes, “I can still recall a moment in writing this book 
when I first began to get an idea of how threatened the socialists must 
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have felt. . . . It was akin to understanding how the Nazis could have 
thought the Holocaust a viable solution” (p. 230, compare p. 15). And 
despite his emphasis on the “exception” as being instrumental to sov-
ereignty, Kaplonski remains in the end “struck by the lengths to which 
the socialists went to pay at least lip service, and often much more, to 
the questions of legality and order” (p. 230). Here, Kaplonski’s conun-
drum can be expressed in less theoretical terms by asking, how could 
government officials have such an apparently good conscience about 
such a single-minded campaign of destruction? And how did the gov-
ernment that had done such deeds retain its legitimacy?
 And indeed the legitimacy of the Mongolian state is certainly not 
in question. This fact emerges very clearly from Kaplonski’s discussion 
of the archives and the rehabilitation process. The archives of the secu-
rity organs remain closed, despite Mongolia’s multiparty democratic 
system, with little or no popular pressure to open them to researchers. 
And the rehabilitation process presupposes the legitimacy and conti-
nuity of the Mongolian state. Even today, rehabilitation proceeds under 
a basic assumption of the legitimacy of the Mongolian party-state. The 
heirs of a person executed or imprisoned during the various purges 
may ask to have the charge reinvestigated. If documentation exists, 
and if that documentation indicates that, under the legal standards of 
the time, the charge was not adequately proven, then a decree of reha-
bilitation may be issued. But, as Kaplonski points out, such a decree 
does not declare the charge groundless, only that it was not proven. 
And a number of the figures dealt with in his pages have not been reha-
bilitated. In many instances, this failure is because the commission 
reexamining the case concluded that the charges (usually of counter-
revolutionary conspiracy) were still well-founded enough to merit 
conviction. Thus, the rehabilitation decrees reject neither the norma-
tive and juridical power of the revolutionary state—where opponents 
of the state decided to strike back before the state struck them and 
were duly caught and convicted of counterrevolution—nor the pure 
exception, the metajuridical authority where the state simply executed 
its enemies without pretense of trial or procedure. In the first case, the 
sentences are upheld, and in the second, there is no documentation to 
issue a decree of rehabilitation. Only on the “threshold of undecide-
ability” (p. 31) between these two does the contemporary democratic 
state dare rectify the actions of the revolutionary party-state.
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 Nor is this presumption of fundamental continuity between the 
Mongolian party-state of the 1930s and the pluralistic Mongolian state 
of today challenged by public opinion. Lenin’s and Stalin’s statues have 
gone down, but that of Marshal Choibalsan still stands in front of 
National University of Mongolia—the Choibalsan who ruled Mongo-
lia from 1936 to 1952 and, as part of the extraordinary commission from 
1937 to 1939, personally put his signature to 20,099 orders of execution 
and 5,739 orders of imprisonment. And reading the histories of the era, 
even ones written today, what stands out is the absence of truly oppo-
sitional voices—voices speaking from a position of radical opposition 
to the state that came to power in 1921. No significant body of literature 
speaking from the position of dissidence survives from Mongolia dur-
ing the 1930s, either inside or outside the country. Although there were 
émigré figures like the Diluv Khutagt who wrote memoirs, these mem-
oirs surprisingly sum up the 1930 counterrevolutionary trials as “fair 
enough” (p. 119). In this context, the discussion in which  Kaplonski 
surveys what informants had to say to the authorities about how the 
public, lay and lama, viewed the trials is both particularly valuable and 
frustrating—valuable because of the rare window into unofficial senti-
ment and frustrating due to the necessity of these voices being pre-
served only through citation by their opponents. Kaplonski stresses 
the “contingency” of the state (pp. 28–29, 223–28), by which term he 
designates the degree to which it dared to exercise sovereignty only 
intermittently and cautiously; in hindsight, however, this political-
power contingency seems yoked with an impressive air of teleological 
inevitability that silenced even its enemies. Accused counterrevolu-
tionaries, such as the Manzshir Hutagt, counseled their followers to 
nonresistance, since the destruction of Buddhism was inevitable and 
prophesied. Thus, the confidence of the revolutionaries, stemming 
from their Marxist-inflected version of the secularization thesis, dove-
tailed neatly with Buddhist ideas of the decline of the dharma (what in 
East Asian contexts was referred to as mofa (Ch.) or mappō ( J.) 末法, 
the final age of Buddhist degeneration).
 But such specifically Buddhalogical or religious issues rarely 
appear in The Lama Question, which is very much a work at the inter-
section of archival history and political anthropology. More or less 
missing from the theoretical and comparative underpinnings of the 
book is any grounding in the disciplines of religious studies and the 
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history of secularization. This absence is a pity, as such grounding 
would have enriched the account. Far more so than the Argentinian 
Dirty War or the Holocaust, The Lama Question presents much more 
specific analogies to campaigns of violent secularization as conducted 
in—to take an almost contemporary case—the anti-Catholic cam-
paigns during the Mexican Revolution. What is striking in such cases 
of “secularization from above”5 is how the pressure against the institu-
tions of the church or sangha are accompanied by a form of “religion-
making” in which institutional-ideological complexes that previously 
placed their heart in socially rooted praxis and authority are reshaped 
as entities focused on purely individual and internalized belief—that 
is, a “religion” in the sense that it is understood in contemporary juris-
prudence of secular states.6
 The marks of this unwilling transformation appear periodically 
throughout Kaplonski’s work, particularly in the repeated assertions 
by representatives of the state that they have no interest in infringing 
on the right of Mongolians to believe or not to believe and that “pure” 
Buddhism was thoroughly consistent with socialist order (pp. 162–63). 
Indeed, the revolutionary state engaged in repeated efforts to reform 
and purify Buddhism and so make it conform to the modern category 
of religion—eliminating practices such as exorcisms and spirit pos-
session, which by nature challenged the foundational liberal concept 
of an autonomous subjectivity, or Buddhist medicine, which likewise 
challenged the relegation of Buddhism as a “religion” to a purely non-
physical sphere. In short, far from simply assuming a uniform unaccept-
ability of Buddhism and proceeding to eliminate it, the religious laws 
in the first and second technologies of exception explicitly undertook 
to remake Buddhism, rejecting only a vaguely defined but nonetheless 
real category of “wrong” (buruu) beliefs. In so doing, they implicitly 
asserted the existence of a Buddhism compatible with the revolutionary 
order. And in all these activities of classifying and reforming the sha shin 
(conventionally translated as [Buddhist] “religion”) into Shakya muni’s 
religion,7 the Buddhist clergy were themselves made complicit through 
5 See the essays in Secularism and Religion-Making, ed. Markus Dressler and Arvind-Pal 
S. Mandair (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). I thank Jolyon Thomas for bringing 
this work to my attention.
6 See Donald S. Lopez Jr., “Belief,” in Critical Terms for Religious Studies, ed. Mark C. 
Taylor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 21–35.
7 But see Alicia Turner, “Religion-Making and Its Failures: Turning Monasteries into 
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cooptation as staff in the religious administration. But lamas stub-
bornly insisted that their shashin could not be divorced from its insti-
tutionally and socially incarnate body; an informant reported one lama 
official as saying, “If there is no money [jas] or teachers, there will be 
no religion” (p. 196).8
 Throughout his book, Kaplonski asks “why it took so long to kill 
the lamas” (p. 13) and argues that the third technology of exception 
was not something planned from the beginning or merely tactically 
postponed but a “last resort” (p. 33), even a sign of resignation and 
defeat—the revolutionary state’s, not the lamas’. But he never quite 
defines what the project of the state was that came to defeat in 1937. 
Following from what I have noted above, what defeated the revolution-
ary state was not simply the persistent scale of the material power of 
the Buddhist sangha—its jas (treasury) and network of teachers that 
defined its existence—but its inability or unwillingness to even con-
ceive of, let alone effectively play, the role of a modern “religion,” one 
purely spiritual and divorced entirely from material life. The evidence 
Kaplonski assembles suggests that, although Mongolia had its “militant 
atheists,” it was not their puerile attacks but the enraged frustration of 
sincere believers in such a “purified” Buddhism that powered the final 
solution in 1937–1938. And it is the acceptance by Mongolians today, 
Buddhist and atheist (burkhangüi, lit. Buddha-less) alike, of the state’s 
right as a secular power to define what constitutes a well-behaved “reli-
gion” that constitutes the fundamental ground for the absolution that 
the Mongolian public has granted to the state’s actions during its revo-
lutionary adolescence. In this sense, although both what died in 1939 
and what then reappeared in 1944 with the reopening of Mongolia’s 
Gandan monastery are called shashin, in reality they constituted fun-
damentally different social categories—the first an autonomous social 
institution defining itself, the second a religious department of the 
state.
Schools and Buddhism into a Religion in Colonial Burma,” in Secularism and Religion-
Making, pp. 226–42, esp. pp. 231–32. The Pali term sāsana has a common origin with San-
skrit śāsana, whence came Mongolian shashin. In modern usage, however, the semantic 
field of Mongolian shashin has been thoroughly reshaped to match that of “religion” and 
its European cognates.
8 Kaplonski does not give the Mongolian here, but I think it may be assumed to be 
sha shin or nom (the usual translation of Sanskrit dharma and Tibetan chos). In any case, 
“religion” in the privatized and differentiated sense used by modern, secular regimes is not 
implied.
